The ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas is typically associated with a punishing conception of responsibility rather than freedom. In this chapter, our aim is to explore Levinas’s often overlooked theory of freedom. Specifically, we compare Levinas’s account of freedom to the Kantian (and Fichtean) idea of freedom as autonomy and the Hegelian idea of freedom as relational. Based on these comparisons, we suggest that Levinas offers a distinctive conception of freedom—“finite freedom.” In contrast to Kantian autonomy, finite freedom constitutively involves (...) standing in certain social relations with others. And in contrast to Hegelian relational freedom, the social relations involved in finite freedom are not defined by mutual recognition, but by feelings of separation and even antagonism. Along the way, we promote a reading Levinas’s Totality and Infinity as a Hegel-style story of Bildung (development), and show how, on Levinas’s view, freedom can develop or mature in the life of the individual. (shrink)

Перевод статьи: Davies T., Chandler R. Online deliberation design: Choices, criteria, and evidence // Democracy in motion: Evaluating the practice and impact of deliberative civic engagement / Nabatchi T., Weiksner M., Gastil J., Leighninger M. (eds.). -- Oxford: Oxford univ. press, 2013. -- P. 103-131. А. Кулик. -/- Вниманию читателей предлагается обзор эмпирических исследований в области дизайна онлайн-форумов, предназначенных для вовлечения граждан в делиберацию. Размерности дизайна определены для различных характеристик делиберации: назначения, целевой аудитории, разобщенности участников в пространстве и во (...) времени, среды коммуникации и организации делиберативного процесса. После краткого обзора критериев оценки вариантов дизайна рассматриваются эмпирические данные, соотносящиеся с каждым из вариантов. Эффективность онлайн-делиберации зависит от того, насколько условия коммуникации соотносятся с заданиями делиберации. Компромиссы, как, например, между анонимным или идентифицируемым участием, предполагают различные дизайны в зависимости от цели делиберации и состава участников. Выводы исследования получены на материале существующих технологий и могут измениться по мере коэволюции технологий и пользователей. (shrink)

(Report assembled for the Workshop of the AMIA Working Group on Formal Biomedical Knowledge Representation in connection with AMIA Symposium, Washington DC, 2005.) Best practices in ontology building for biomedicine have been frequently discussed in recent years. However there is a range of seemingly disparate views represented by experts in the field. These views not only reflect the different uses to which ontologies are put, but also the experiences and disciplinary background of these experts themselves. We asked six questions related (...) to biomedical ontologies to what we believe is a representative sample of ontologists in the biomedical field and came to a number conclusions which we believe can help provide an insight into the practical problems which ontology builders face today. (shrink)

This paper models knowledge in cases where an agent has multiple experiences over time. Using this model, we introduce a series of observations that undermine the pretheoretic idea that the evidential significance of experience depends on the extent to which that experience matches the world. On the basis of these observations, we model knowledge in terms of what is likely given the agent’s experience. An agent knows p when p is implied by her epistemic possibilities. A world is epistemically possible (...) when its probability given the agent’s experiences is not significantly lower than the probability of the actual world given that experience. (shrink)

This paper explores the principle that knowledge is fragile, in that whenever S knows that S doesn’t know that S knows that p, S thereby fails to know p. Fragility is motivated by the infelicity of dubious assertions, utterances which assert p while acknowledging higher-order ignorance whether p. Fragility is interestingly weaker than KK, the principle that if S knows p, then S knows that S knows p. Existing theories of knowledge which deny KK by accepting a Margin for Error (...) principle can be conservatively extended with Fragility. (shrink)

Initially introduced to the philosophical world as elusive, we-know-notwhats—substrata underlying the properties had or exemplified by things, but themselves bereft of properties—bare particulars have been dismissed as undetectable, unnecessary, and even incoherent. Hardly a warm welcome. It appears, however, that times are changing. In a recent series of articles, for example, J. P. Moreland has argued that “bare particulars are crucial entities in any adequate overall theory of individuation”;’ that is, concrete particulars cannot be individuated without them. In the same (...) vein, Oaklander and Rothstein,2 drawing upon elements of Moreland’s new theory, have defended bare particulars against Loux’s grounding objection’—that if the theory is correct, bare particulars are qualitatively indiscernible; in which case we either have no basis for saying that they arc numerically diverse, or we must introduce lower-level substrata to ground that diversity, thereby raising the spectre of an infinite regress of individuators. (shrink)

In recent years, a number of theorists have claimed that beliefs about probability are transparent. To believe probably p is simply to have a high credence that p. In this paper, I prove a variety of triviality results for theses like the above. I show that such claims are inconsistent with the thesis that probabilistic modal sentences have propositions or sets of worlds as their meaning. Then I consider the extent to which a dynamic semantics for probabilistic modals can capture (...) theses connecting belief, certainty, credence, and probability. I show that although a dynamic semantics for probabilistic modals does allow one to validate such theses, it can only do so at a cost. I prove that such theses can only be valid if probabilistic modals do not satisfy the axioms of the probability calculus. (shrink)

Many defend the thesis that when someone knows p, they couldn’t easily have been wrong about p. But the notion of easy possibility in play is relatively undertheorized. One structural idea in the literature, the principle of Counterfactual Closure (CC), connects easy possibility with counterfactuals: if it easily could have happened that p, and if p were the case, then q would be the case, it follows that it easily could have happened that q. We first argue that while CC (...) is false, there is a true restriction of it to cases involving counterfactual dependence on a coin flip. The failure of CC falsifies a model where the easy possibilities are counterfactually similar to actuality. Next, we show that extant normality models, where the easy possibilities are the sufficiently normal ones, are incompatible with the restricted CC thesis involving coin flips. Next, we develop a new kind of normality theory that can accommodate the restricted version of CC. This new theory introduces a principle of Counterfactual Contamination, which says roughly that any world is fairly abnormal if at that world very abnormal events counterfactually depend on a coin flip. Finally, we explain why coin flips and other related events have a special status. A central take home lesson is that the correct principle in the vicinity of Safety is importantly normality-theoretic rather than (as it is usually conceived) similarity-theoretic. (shrink)

According to telling based views of testimony (TBVs), B has reason to believe that p when A tells B that p because A thereby takes public responsibility for B's subsequent belief that p. Andrew Peet presents a new argument against TBVs. He argues that insofar as A uses context-sensitive expressions to express p, A doesn't take public responsibility for B's belief that p. Since context-sensitivity is widespread, the kind of reason TBVs say we have to believe what we're told, is (...) not widespread. Peet doesn't identify any problem with his own argument though he does attempt to limit its sceptical potential by identifying special contexts in which TBVs stand a chance of success. A more general defence of TBVs can be provided by showing Peet's argument to be unsound. I argue that Peet's argument is unsound because it requires us to wrongly suppose that speakers do far less labour than their audiences in context-sensitive linguistic communication. I aim to show why—in the context of the epistemology of testimony and the philosophy of language—it's important to recognize the labour that speakers can do, and so can can be held responsible for not doing, in episodes of context-sensitive linguistic communication. (shrink)

In this chapter, we attempt to show that J.P. Moreland's understanding of apologetics is beautifully positioned to counter resistance to a rationally defensible Christianity—resistance arising from the mistaken idea that any rational defense will fail to support or even undermine relationship. We look first at Paul Moser's complaint that since rational apologetics doesn’t prove the God of Christianity, it falls short of delivering what matters most—a personal agent worthy of worship and relationship. We then consider John Wilkinson's charge that the (...) use of reason and argument in evangelistic contexts is relationally futile. Since people aren’t looking for arguments, and logic is an arbitrary human invention, we should present Christianity to others as an irrational faith story. (shrink)

“Critical thinking in higher education” is a phrase that means many things to many people. It is a broad church. Does it mean a propensity for finding fault? Does it refer to an analytical method? Does it mean an ethical attitude or a disposition? Does it mean all of the above? Educating to develop critical intellectuals and the Marxist concept of critical consciousness are very different from the logician’s toolkit of finding fallacies in passages of text, or the practice of (...) identifying and distinguishing valid from invalid syllogisms. Critical thinking in higher education can also encompass debates about critical pedagogy, i.e., political critiques of the role and function of education in society, critical feminist approaches to curriculum, issues related to what has become known as critical citizenship, or any other education-related topic that uses the appellation “critical”. Equally, it can, and usually does, refer to the importance and centrality of developing general skills in reasoning—skills that we hope all graduates possess. Yet, despite more than four decades of dedicated scholarly work “critical thinking” remains as elusive as ever. As a concept, it is, as Raymond Williams has noted, a ‘most difficult one’ (Williams, 1976, p. 74). (shrink)

A mental state is luminous if, whenever an agent is in that state, they are in a position to know that they are. Following Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge and Its Limits, a wave of recent work has explored whether there are any non-trivial luminous mental states. A version of Williamson’s anti-luminosity appeals to a safety- theoretic principle connecting knowledge and confidence: if an agent knows p, then p is true in any nearby scenario where she has a similar level of confidence (...) in p. However, the relevant notion of confidence is relatively underexplored. This paper develops a precise theory of confidence: an agent’s degree of confidence in p is the objective chance they will rely on p in practical reasoning. This theory of confidence is then used to critically evaluate the anti-luminosity argument, leading to the surprising conclusion that although there are strong reasons for thinking that luminosity does not obtain, they are quite different from those the existing literature has considered. In particular, we show that once the notion of confidence is properly understood, the failure of luminosity follows from the assumption that knowledge requires high confidence, and does not require any kind of safety principle as a premise. (shrink)

You omega know p when you possess every iteration of knowledge of p. This book argues that omega knowledge plays a central role in philosophy. In particular, the book argues that omega knowledge is necessary for permissible assertion, action, inquiry, and belief. Although omega knowledge plays this important role, existing theories of omega knowledge are unsatisfying. One theory, KK, identifies knowledge with omega knowledge. This theory struggles to accommodate cases of inexact knowledge. The other main theory is skeptical, claiming that (...) we do not omega know any ordinary claims about the world. This book develops and critically compares three new theories of omega knowledge. (shrink)

Formal models of appearance and reality have proved fruitful for investigating structural properties of perceptual knowledge. This paper applies the same approach to epistemic justification. Our central goal is to give a simple account of The Preface, in which justified belief fails to agglomerate. Following recent work by a number of authors, we understand knowledge in terms of normality. An agent knows p iff p is true throughout all relevant normal worlds. To model The Preface, we appeal to the normality (...) of error. Sometimes, it is more normal for reality and appearance to diverge than to match. We show that this simple idea has dramatic consequences for the theory of knowledge and justification. Among other things, we argue that a proper treatment of The Preface requires a departure from the internalist idea that epistemic justification supervenes on the appearances and the widespread idea that one knows most when free from error. (shrink)

This paper is a defence of a psychological view of personal identity against the attack Peter Unger launches against it in his Identity, Consciousness and Value. Unger attempts to undermine the traditional support which a psychological criterion of identity has drawn from thought-experiments, and to show that such a criterion has totally unacceptable implications -- in particular, that it allows that persons can go out of and come back into existence. I respond to both aspects of this criticism, arguing that (...) the relevant thought-experiments (and the support they appear to offer) survive Unger's attack intact, and that he does not establish his case against intermittent existence. (shrink)

Spanish version of my analysis of Oaxaca-based experimental filmmaker Bruno Varela's 2022 feature-length film El Prototipo, which draws on ideas from Philip K. Dick's novel Valis.

Cyber attackers targeting large corporations achieved a high perimeter penetration success rate during 2013, resulting in many corporations incurring financial losses. Corporate information technology leaders have a fiduciary responsibility to implement information security domain processes that effectually address the challenges for preventing and deterring information security breaches. Grounded in corporate governance theory, the purpose of this correlational study was to examine the relationship between strategic alignment, resource management, risk management, value delivery, performance measurement implementations, and information security governance (ISG) effectiveness (...) in United States-based corporations. Surveys were used to collect data from 95 strategic and tactical leaders of the 500 largest for-profit United States headquartered corporations. The results of the multiple linear regression indicated the model was able to significantly predict ISG effectiveness, F(5, 89) = 3.08, p = 0.01, R² = 0.15. Strategic alignment was the only statistically significant (t = 2.401, p <= 0.018) predictor. The implications for positive social change include the potential to constructively understand the correlates of ISG effectiveness, thus increasing the propensity for consumer trust and reducing consumers' costs. (shrink)

Background Previous analyses of democracy and population health have focused on broad measures, such as life expectancy at birth and child and infant mortality, and have shown some contradictory results. We used a panel of data spanning 170 countries to assess the association between democracy and cause-specific mortality and explore the pathways connecting democratic rule to health gains. -/- Methods We extracted cause-specific mortality and HIV-free life expectancy estimates from the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study 2016 (...) and information on regime type from the Varieties of Democracy project. These data cover 170 countries and 46 years. From the Financing Global Health database, we extracted gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, also covering 46 years, and Development Assistance for Health estimates starting from 1990 and domestic health spending estimates starting from 1995. We used a diverse set of empirical methods—synthetic control, within-country variance decomposition, structural equation models, and fixed-effects regression—which together provide a robust analysis of the association between democratisation and population health. -/- Findings HIV-free life expectancy at age 15 years improved significantly during the study period (1970–2015) in countries after they transitioned to democracy, on average by 3% after 10 years. Democratic experience explains 22·27% of the variance in mortality within a country from cardiovascular diseases, 16·53% for tuberculosis, and 17·78% for transport injuries, and a smaller percentage for other diseases included in the study. For cardiovascular diseases, transport injuries, cancers, cirrhosis, and other non-communicable diseases, democratic experience explains more of the variation in mortality than GDP. Over the past 20 years, the average country's increase in democratic experience had direct and indirect effects on reducing mortality from cardiovascular disease (−9·64%, 95% CI −6·38 to −12·90), other non-communicable diseases (−9·14%, −4·26 to −14·02), and tuberculosis (−8·93%, −2·08 to −15·77). Increases in a country's democratic experience were not correlated with GDP per capita between 1995 and 2015 (ρ=–0·1036; p=0·1826), but were correlated with declines in mortality from cardiovascular disease (ρ=–0·3873; p<0·0001) and increases in government health spending (ρ=0·4002; p<0·0001). Removal of free and fair elections from the democratic experience variable resulted in loss of association with age-standardised mortality from non-communicable diseases and injuries. -/- Interpretation When enforced by free and fair elections, democracies are more likely than autocracies to lead to health gains for causes of mortality (eg, cardiovascular diseases and transport injuries) that have not been heavily targeted by foreign aid and require health-care delivery infrastructure. International health agencies and donors might increasingly need to consider the implications of regime type in their efforts to maximise health gains, particularly in the context of ageing populations and the growing burden of non-communicable diseases. (shrink)

Objective: To assess the relation between autocratisation—substantial decreases in democratic traits (free and fair elections, freedom of civil and political association, and freedom of expression)—and countries’ population health outcomes and progress toward universal health coverage (UHC). -/- Design: Synthetic control analysis. -/- Setting and country selection: Global sample of countries for all years from 1989 to 2019, split into two categories: 17 treatment countries that started autocratising during 2000 to 2010, and 119 control countries that never autocratised from 1989 to (...) 2019. The treatment countries comprised low and middle income nations and represent all world regions except North America and western Europe. A weighted combination of control countries was used to construct synthetic controls for each treatment country. This statistical method is especially well suited to population level studies when random assignment is infeasible and sufficiently similar comparators are not available. The method was originally developed in economics and political science to assess the impact of policies and events, and it is now increasingly used in epidemiology. -/- Main outcome measures: HIV-free life expectancy at age 5 years, UHC effective coverage index (0-100 point scale), and out-of-pocket spending on health per capita. All outcome variables are for the period 1989 to 2019. -/- Results: Autocratising countries underperformed for all three outcome variables in the 10 years after the onset of autocratisation, despite some improvements in life expectancy, UHC effective coverage index, and out-of-pocket spending on health. On average, HIV-free life expectancy at age 5 years increased by 2.2% (from 64.7 to 66.1 years) during the 10 years after the onset of autocratisation. This study estimated that it would have increased by 3.5% (95% confidence interval 3.3% to 3.6%, P<0.001) (from 64.7 to 66.9 years) in the absence of autocratisation. On average, the UHC effective coverage index increased by 11.9% (from 42.5 to 47.6 points) during the 10 years after the onset of autocratisation. This study estimated that it would have increased by 20.2% (95% confidence interval 19.6% to 21.2%, P<0.001) (from 42.5 to 51.1 points) in the absence of autocratisation. Finally, on average, out-of-pocket spending on health per capita increased by 10.0% (from $4.00 (£3.1; €3.4) to $4.4, log transformed) during the 10 years after the onset of autocratisation. This study estimated that it would have increased by only 4.4% (95% confidence interval 3.9% to 4.6%, P<0.001) (from $4.0 to $4.2, log transformed) in the absence of autocratisation. -/- Conclusions: Autocratising countries had worse than estimated life expectancy, effective health service coverage, and levels of out-of-pocket spending on health. These results suggest that the noticeable increase in the number of countries that are experiencing democratic erosion in recent years is hindering population health gains and progress toward UHC. Global health institutions will need to adjust their policy recommendations and activities to obtain the best possible results in those countries with a diminishing democratic incentive to provide quality healthcare to populations. (shrink)

Since the release of ChatGPT, there has been a lot of debate about whether AI systems pose an existential risk to humanity. This paper develops a general framework for thinking about the existential risk of AI systems. We analyze a two-premise argument that AI systems pose a threat to humanity. Premise one: AI systems will become extremely powerful. Premise two: if AI systems become extremely powerful, they will destroy humanity. We use these two premises to construct a taxonomy of ‘survival (...) stories’, in which humanity survives into the far future. In each survival story, one of the two premises fails. Either scientific barriers prevent AI systems from becoming extremely powerful; or humanity bans research into AI systems, thereby preventing them from becoming extremely powerful; or extremely powerful AI systems do not destroy humanity, because their goals prevent them from doing so; or extremely powerful AI systems do not destroy humanity, because we can reliably detect and disable systems that have the goal of doing so. We argue that different survival stories face different challenges. We also argue that different survival stories motivate different responses to the threats from AI. Finally, we use our taxonomy to produce rough estimates of ‘P(doom)’, the probability that humanity will be destroyed by AI. (shrink)

When thinking about collective responsibility, we face a dilemma: on the one hand, we want to hold individuals, such as the responsible—or representative members accountable; on the other hand, we want to blame the entire corporation, as an independent entity over and above its composite parts. Such questions are taken up by Jennifer Lackey in her short but rich monograph. She points out that the two described ways of approaching collective responsibility are linked to the central divide between deflationist and (...) inflationist approaches to social philosophy. While deflationists understand collective attitudes as being entirely grasped by analysing “individual members and their states”, inflationists hold that “group phenomena are importantly over and above, or otherwise distinct from, individual members and their states” (p. 3). Amidst several thought-provoking and insightful philosophical ideas introduced and discussed by Lackey, there is one that stretches throughout the entire book: the will to overcome this traditional division between inflationism and deflationism. As such, the book can be understood as having two interrelated projects, one being negative and the second being positive. The critical project is an extensive critical analysis of both inflationary/non-summativist, as well as deflationary/summativist approaches to socio-epistemological phenomena. In five chapters, each devoted to one phenomenon, Lackey discusses group belief (chapter 1), group justified belief (chapter 2), group knowledge (chapter 3), group assertions (chapter 4), and group lies (chapter 5). (shrink)

According to Val Plumwood (1995), liberal-democracy is an authoritarian political system that protects privilege but fails to protect nature. A major obstacle, she says, is radical inequality, which has become increasingly far-reaching under liberal-democracy; an indicator of ‘the capacity of its privileged groups to distribute social goods upwards and to create rigidities which hinder the democratic correctiveness of social institutions’ (p. 134). This cautionary tale has repercussions for education, especially civics and citizenship education. To address this, we explore the potential (...) of what Gerard Delanty calls ‘cultural citizenship’ as an alternative to the disciplinary citizenship that permeates Western liberal discourse. Cultural citizenship emphasises citizenship as communication and continual learning processes, rejecting the idea of citizenship as a fixed set of cultural ideals, norms or values defined and enforced by liberal society’s legal, political and cultural institutions, including education and ‘citizenship training’. However, we contend that a critical first step, essential to democratic correctiveness, is to clear away obstacles created by the privileging of a dominant epistemic position. We conclude that Plumwood’s philosophy alongside John Dewey’s work on democracy and education provide a theoretical framework for effective democratic inquiry aimed towards interconnective, deliberative practice and corrective methodology for epistemic accountability. (shrink)

Michael Hunter, The Boyle Papers: Understanding the Manuscripts of Robert Boyle. With contributions by Edward B. Davis, Harriet Knight, Charles Littleton and Lawrence M. Principe. Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007. Pp. xiii + 674. US$139.95/£70.00 HB. -/- The publication by Michael Hunter of this revised edition of the catalogue of the Boyle Papers contributes admirably to the renaissance in Boyle studies which has taken place over the past decade and a half. Robert Boyle (1627–91), arguably the most influential British (...) scientist of the late seventeenth century, was a pioneering experimenter, profound thinker, and figure-head of the new science in its early years of development. This volume brings together the materials necessary for understanding the Boyle archive, one of the most important archives from this period, which has been at the Royal Society since 1769. (shrink)

In late 2014, the jazz combo Mostly Other People Do the Killing released Blue—an album that is a note-for-note remake of Miles Davis's 1959 landmark album Kind of Blue. This is a thought experiment made concrete, raising metaphysical puzzles familiar from discussion of indiscernible counterparts. It is an actual album, rather than merely a concept, and so poses the aesthetic puzzle of why one would ever actually listen to it.

According to the Unfinished Business Account, if actor p reasonably judges performing a supererogatory act ϕ at great sacrifice to herself will enable beneficiary q to achieve a greater good, then failure to promote the good made possible by ϕ wrongs p. Elizabeth Finneron-Burns questions whether it follows that we have a duty to render the sacrifices of past (and present) people more worthwhile by preventing human extinction. This note responds to her criticisms.

The purpose of this study is exposition on the themes of method and mysticism in the work of Simone Weil. Nearly a decade before the onset of her first mystical experience, Weil developed a method to be rigorously applied in daily philosophical reflection. She outlines this method in her dissertation on Descartes (1929-1930). I examine the question of how Weil applied method to philosophical reflection on her mystical experiences (onset 1938-1939). I analyze Weil’s mystical experiences as a type of transformative (...) experience in L. A. Paul’s strict sense of the term. On Paul’s view, an experience is transformative if it is both epistemically and personally transformative. An experience is epistemically transformative if the only way to know what it is like to have it is to have it yourself. An experience is personally transformative if it changes your point of view, including your core preferences (Paul, 2014). I present a thought experiment and textual evidence to motivate the claim that Weil’s mystical experiences meet Paul’s conditions for transformative experience. I then propose two epistemological facts that can be revealed by philosophical reflection on mystical experience. First, it is possible to read meaning erroneously in the appearances of things. Second, it is possible to come to hold to the certainty of a conviction for reasons that elude the intellect. My findings suggest that Weil’s late views on philosophy accommodate these two epistemological constraints, thereby demonstrating a possible connection between Weil’s mystical experiences and her mature views on the nature, scope, and proper method of philosophy. However, my preliminary findings also suggest that Weil’s early work on method may have anticipated these epistemological obstacles prior to the onset of her first mystical experience. Thus, further exposition of Weil’s method is needed to support or elucidate the claim (Rozelle-Stone and Davis, 2021) that Weil’s epistemology underwent significant changes because of her mystical experiences. (shrink)

Simon Blackburn has not shied away from the use of vivid imagery in developing, over a long and prolific career, a large-scale philosophical vision. Here one might think, for instance, of ‘Practical Tortoise Raising’ or ‘Ramsey's Ladder’ or ‘Frege's Abyss’. Blackburn develops a ‘quasi-realist’ account of many of our philosophical and everyday commitments, both theoretical (e.g., modality and causation) and practical (e.g., moral judgement and normative reasons). Quasi-realism aims to provide a naturalistic treatment of its targeted phenomena while earning (...) the right to deploy all of the ‘trappings’ of realism—i.e., while eschewing any idea that our normal thought and talk about such phenomena are pervasively in error. The quasi-realist project is that of explaining how (as Huw Price puts it here) ‘the folk come to “talk the realist talk” without committing ourselves—us theorists, as it were—to “walking the metaphysical walk”’ (p. 136). Quasi-realism, too, can speak of truth, facts, properties, belief, knowledge, and so on. The imagery in this collection also abounds, though, in capturing a different view of quasi-realism: No fewer than three of the contributors picture Blackburn as wanting to have his cake and eat it too (Louise Antony asking, in addition, ‘Who doesn't? It's cake’ [p. 19]). (shrink)

Review of *New Essays on the A Priori*, an excellent collection edited by Paul Boghossian and Christopher Peacocke. Contributors include: Tyler Burge; Quassim Cassam; Philip Kitcher; Penelope Maddy; Hartry Field; Paul Horwich; Peter Railton; Stephen Yablo; Bob Hale; Crispin Wright; Frank Jackson; Stewart Shapiro; Michael Friedman; Martin Davies; Bill Brewer; and Thomas Nagel.

Davies argues that the ontology of artworks as performances offers a principled way of explaining work-relativity of modality. Object oriented contextualist ontologies of art (Levinson) cannot adequately address the problem of work-relativity of modal properties because they understand looseness in what counts as the same context as a view that slight differences in the work-constitutive features of provenance are work-relative. I argue that it is more in the spirit of contextualism to understand looseness as context-dependent. This points to the (...) general problem—the context of appreciation is not robust enough to ground modal intuitions about objective entities. In general, when epistemology dictates ontology there is always a threat of anti-realism, scepticism and relativism. Davies also appeals to the modality principle—an entity’s essential properties are all and only its constitutive properties. Davies understands essentiality in a traditional way: a property P is an essential property of an object o iff o could not exist and lack P. Kit Fine has recently made a convincing case for the view that the notion of essence is not to be understood in modal terms. I explore some of the implications of this view for Davies’ modal argument for the performance theory. (shrink)

‘Epistemic exploitation occurs when privileged persons compel marginalised knowers to educate them [and others] about the nature of their oppression’ (Berenstain, 2016, p. 569). This paper scrutinizes some of the purported wrongs underpinning this practice, so that educators might be better equipped to understand and avoid or mitigate harms which may result from such interventions. First, building on the work of Berenstain and Davis (2016), we argue that when privileged persons (in this context, educators) repeatedly compel marginalised or oppressed knowers, (...) to not only to educate them, but indeed others, about the nature of their oppression, they risk subjecting them to further epistemic-moral harms. This is due to the likelihood that at least some of their audience will assign them less/more credibility than they deserve based on pre-existing identity-based prejudices. Second, though some of these requests to ‘educate’ or ‘learn more’ masquerade as seemingly virtuous or innocuous epistemic inquiries, privileged persons underestimate or remain ignorant of secondary harms which stem from internalized epistemic obligations, oppressive double-binds (Hirji, 2021), and attendant emotional burdens oppressed knowers carry in relation to the ever-present possibility of ameliorating oppressor mindsets. After surveying each context-specific harm briefly, we then turn to an applied reading of how these exploitative practices sometimes culminate in something we refer to as ‘ontic burnout’, a form of interminable explanatory fatigue brought on by repeated requests to educate the privileged about what it means to be oppressed. (shrink)

This paper gives an outline of truthmaker semantics for natural language against the background of standard possible-worlds semantics. It develops a truthmaker semantics for attitude reports and deontic modals based on an ontology of attitudinal and modal objects and on a semantic function of clauses as predicates of such objects. It also présents new motivations for 'object-based truthmaker semantics' from intensional transitive verbs such as ‘need’, ‘look for’, ‘own’, and ‘buy’ and gives an outline of their semantics. This paper is (...) a commissioned 'target' article, with commentaries by W. Davis, B. Arsenijevic, K. Moulton, K. Liefke, M. Kaufmann, R. Matthews, P. Portner and A. Rubinstein, P. Elliott, G. Ramchand and my reply. (shrink)

This book is a survey of the most important developments in Austrian philosophy in its classical period from the 1870s to the Anschluss in 1938. Thus it is intended as a contribution to the history of philosophy. But I hope that it will be seen also as a contribution to philosophy in its own right as an attempt to philosophize in the spirit of those, above all Roderick Chisholm, Rudolf Haller, Kevin Mulligan and Peter Simons, who have done so much (...) to demonstrate the continued fertility of the ideas and methods of the Austrian philosophers in our own day. For some time now, historians of philosophy have been gradually coming to terms with the idea that post-Kantian philosophy in the German-speaking world ought properly to be divided into two distinct traditions which we might refer to as the German and Austrian traditions, respectively. The main line of the first consists in a list of personages beginning with Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Schelling and ending with Heidegger, Adorno and Bloch. The main line of the second may be picked out similarly by means of a list beginning with Bolzano, Mach and Meinong, and ending with Wittgenstein, Neurath and Popper. As should be clear, it is the Austrian tradition that has contributed most to the contemporary mainstream of philosophical thinking in the Anglo-Saxon world. For while there are of course German thinkers who have made crucial contributions to the development of exact or analytic philosophy, such thinkers were outsiders when seen from the perspective of native German philosophical culture, and in fact a number of them found their philosophical home precisely in Vienna. When, in contrast, we examine the influence of the Austrian line, we encounter a whole series of familiar and unfamiliar links to the characteristic concerns of more recent philosophy of the analytic sort. As Michael Dummett points out in his Origins of Analytic Philosophy, the newly fashionable habit of referring to analytic philosophy as "Anglo-American" is in this light a "grave historical distortion". If, he says, we take into account the historical context in which analytic philosophy developed, then such philosophy "could at least as well be called "Anglo-Austrian" (1988, p. 7). Much valuable scholarly work has been done on the thinking of Husserl and Wittgenstein, Mach and the Vienna Circle. The central axis of Austrian philosophy, however, which as I hope to show in what follows is constituted by the work of Brentano and his school, is still rather poorly understood. Work on Meinong or Twardowski by contemporary philosophers still standardly rests upon simplified and often confused renderings of a few favoured theses taken out of context. Little attention is paid to original sources, and little effort is devoted to establishing what the problems were by which the Austrian philosophers in general were exercised -- in spite of the fact that many of these same problems have once more become important as a result of the contemporary burgeoning of interest on the part of philosophers in problems in the field of cognitive science. (shrink)

The representations of deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are formed from generalizing similarities and abstracting from differences in the manner of the empiricist theory of abstraction (Buckner, Synthese 195:5339–5372, 2018). The empiricist theory of abstraction is well understood to entail infinite regress and circularity in content constitution (Husserl, Logical Investigations. Routledge, 2001). This paper argues these entailments hold a fortiori for deep CNNs. Two theses result: deep CNNs require supplementation by Quine’s “apparatus of identity and quantification” in order to (1) (...) achieve concepts, and (2) represent objects, as opposed to “half-entities” corresponding to similarity amalgams (Quine, Quintessence, Cambridge, 2004, p. 107). Similarity amalgams are also called “approximate meaning[s]” (Marcus & Davis, Rebooting AI, Pantheon, 2019, p. 132). Although Husserl inferred the “complete abandonment of the empiricist theory of abstraction” (a fortiori deep CNNs) due to the infinite regress and circularity arguments examined in this paper, I argue that the statistical learning of deep CNNs may be incorporated into a Fodorian hybrid account that supports Quine’s “sortal predicates, negation, plurals, identity, pronouns, and quantifiers” which are representationally necessary to overcome the regress/circularity in content constitution and achieve objective (as opposed to similarity-subjective) representation (Burge, Origins of Objectivity. Oxford, 2010, p. 238). I base myself initially on Yoshimi’s (New Frontiers in Psychology, 2011) attempt to explain Husserlian phenomenology with neural networks but depart from him due to the arguments and consequently propose a two-system view which converges with Weiskopf’s proposal (“Observational Concepts.” The Conceptual Mind. MIT, 2015. 223–248). (shrink)

This is a reply to the commentaries on my paper 'Truthmaker Semantics for Natural Language: Attitude Verbs, Modals, and Intensional Transitive Verbs'. The paper is a commissioned 'target' article, with commentaries by W. Davis, B. Arsenijevic, K. Moulton, K. Liefke, M. Kaufman, R. Matthews, P. Portner and A. Rubinstein, P. Elliott, and G. Ramchand.

According to the account of artifacts developed by Lynne Rudder Baker, artifacts have a certain “proper function” essentially. The proper function of an artifact is the purpose or use intended for the artifact by its “author(s)”, viz., the artifact’s designer(s) and/or producer(s). Baker’s account therefore traces the essences of artifacts back indirectly to the intentions of an artifact’s original author (e.g., its inventor, maker, producer or designer). Like other “author-intention-based” accounts (e.g., those defended by Amie Thomasson, Simon Evnine, and (...) others), Baker’s treatment, or so I have argued, is subject to the concern that, when stated in its most general form, human creative intentions are not nearly as powerful and discriminating as proponents of author-intention-based accounts make them out to be (see Kathrin Koslicki, Form, Matter, Substance, Oxford University Press, 2018, Chapter 8). When Baker responds to a version of this objection launched against her account by Theodore Sider and Dean Zimmerman, she proposes that we cannot simply think things into existence for which “our conventions and practices do not have a place” (Lynne Rudder Baker, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism, 2007, p. 44). For example, I cannot, according to Baker, make up the word, “bonangle”, apply it to a piece of driftwood and thereby succeed in bringing into existence a new artifact, viz., a bonangle, merely by thinking to myself “It would be nice if the world contained bonangles; I hereby make that piece of driftwood a bonangle”. In order for this response to be effective, however, more needs to be said about how our conventions and practices support the creation of some artifacts and artifact kinds, while disallowing the attempted creation of others. In this paper, I examine the effectiveness of Baker’s response in addressing the challenges posed by the inclusion of artifacts in Baker’s practical realist ontology. (shrink)

Philosopher’s judgements on the philosophical value of Tarski’s contributions to the theory of truth have varied. For example Karl Popper, Rudolf Carnap, and Donald Davidson have, in their different ways, celebrated Tarski’s achievements and have been enthusiastic about their philosophical relevance. Hilary Putnam, on the other hand, pronounces that “[a]s a philosophical account of truth, Tarski’s theory fails as badly as it is possible for an account to fail.” Putnam has several alleged reasons for his dissatisfaction,1 but one of them, (...) the one I call the modal objection (cf. Raatikainen 2003), has been particularly influential. In fact, very similar objections have been presented over and over again in the literature. Already in 1954, Arthur Pap had criticized Tarski’s account with a similar argument (Pap 1954). Moreover, both Scott Soames (1984) and John Etchemendy (1988) use, with an explicit reference to Putnam, similar modal arguments in relation to Tarski. Richard Heck (1997), too, shows some sympathy for such considerations. Simon Blackburn (1984, Ch. 8) has put forward a related argument against Tarski. Recently, Marian David has criticized Tarski’s truth definition with an analogous argument as well (David 2004, p. 389-390).2 This line of argument is thus apparently one of the most influential critiques of Tarski. It is certainly worthy of serious attention. Nevertheless, I shall argue that, given closer scrutiny, it does not present such an acute problem for the Tarskian approach to truth as many philosophers think. But I also believe that it is important to understand clearly why this is so. Moreover, I think that a careful consideration of the issue illuminates certain important but somewhat neglected aspects of the Tarskian approach. (shrink)

The basic idea of expressivism is that for some sentences ‘P’, believing that P is not just a matter of having an ordinary descriptive belief. This is a way of capturing the idea that the meaning of some sentences either exceeds their factual/descriptive content or doesn’t consist in any particular factual/descriptive content at all, even in context. The paradigmatic application for expressivism is within metaethics, and holds that believing that stealing is wrong involves having some kind of desire-like attitude, with (...) world-tomind direction of fit, either in place of, or in addition to, being in a representational state of mind with mind-to-world direction of fit. Because expressivists refer to the state of believing that P as the state of mind ‘expressed’ by ‘P’, this view can also be described as the view that ‘stealing is wrong’ expresses a state of mind that involves a desire-like attitude instead of, or in addition to, a representational state of mind. According to some expressivists - unrestrained expressivists, as I’ll call them - there need be no special relationship among the different kinds of state of mind that can be expressed by sentences. Pick your favorite state of mind, the unrestrained expressivist allows, and there could, at least in principle, be a sentence that expressed it. Expressivists who seem to have been unrestrained plausibly include Ayer in Language, Truth, and Logic, and Simon Blackburn in many of his writings, including his [1984], [1993], and.. (shrink)

Nick Zangwill (2004, 2007) appears to be acquiring the status of repudiator-in-chief of emotion in music. He is invoked in this role by such authors as Kraut (2007, p. 67), Bonds (2014, p. 5), Robinson (2014), Young (2014, pp. vii, 1, 3–4, 151), Davies (2017) and Kania (2017). His ‘manifesto’ paper (2004) was recently reprinted in Lamarque and Olsen (2018, pp. 574–582). This development is unfortunate, because Zangwill, for all his radical-sounding theses, actually argues against views that hardly anyone (...) holds. What is more, some of his arguments in favour of the obvious seem confused and defective. But as for his really radical thesis that ‘Music, in itself, has nothing to do with emotion’, he provides hardly any justification. What is more, contrary to what Zangwill believes, such justification is not to be found in Hanslick, who in fact sees emotional content as a relatively important element of music. (shrink)

In 1890 Christian von Ehrenfels published his classic paper "Über 'Gestaltqualitäten'", the first systematic investigation of the philosophy and psychology of Gestalt. Ehrenfels thereby issued an important challenge to the psychological atomism that was still predominant in his day. His paper not only exerted a powerful influence on the philosophy of the Meinong school, it also marked the beginning of the Gestalt tradition in psychology, later associated with the work of Wertheimer, Köhler and Koffka in Berlin. Includes papers by C. (...) Von Ehrenfels, Kurt Grelling and Paul Oppenheim and contributions by K. Mulligan, P.M. Simons and Barry Smith. (shrink)

This is my Cambridge PhD thesis, written under the supervision of Hugh Mellor and Richard Healey, and examined by Mary Hesse and Simon Blackburn. It addresses what it takes to be the core of the problem of single case probability, namely, the interpretation of claims such as ‘It is probable that P’ (where the probabilistic component occurs as a sentential or propositional operator). I argue that claims of this form are not genuinely truth-apt, and that such operators modify the (...) force, rather than the sense, of sentences or propositions to which they attach. In contemporary terms, I thus defend a version of what Yalcin (2012) has called ‘credal expressivism’. Some of the core arguments were later published in the following papers: (i) ‘Does “Probably” modify sense?’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61(1983), 396–408 and (ii) 'Mellor, chance and the single case', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35(1984), 11-23. Other arguments, including an attempt at the Frege-Geach problem, form the basis of an unpublished piece 'The use of force in a theory of meaning' (1983), accessible at PhilPapers. (shrink)

ABSTRACT It has become standard to conceive of metalinguistic disagreement as motivated by a form of negotiation, aimed at reaching consensus because of the practical consequences of using a word with one content rather than another. This paper presents an alternative motive for expressing and pursuing metalinguistic disagreement. In using words with given criteria, we betray our location amongst social categories or groups. Because of this, metalinguistic disagreement can be used as a stage upon which to perform a social identity. (...) The ways in which metalinguistic disagreements motivated in this way diverge in character from metalinguistic negotiations are described, as are several consequences of the existence of metalinguistic disagreements motivated in this way. (shrink)

This paper resolves a paradox concerning colour constancy. On the one hand, our intuitive, pre-theoretical concept holds that colour constancy involves invariance in the perceived colours of surfaces under changes in illumination. On the other, there is a robust scientific consensus that colour constancy can persist in cerebral achromatopsia, a profound impairment in the ability to perceive colours. The first stage of the solution advocates pluralism about our colour constancy capacities. The second details the close relationship between colour constancy and (...) contrast. The third argues that achromatopsics retain a basic type of colour constancy associated with invariants in contrast processing. The fourth suggests that one person-level, conscious upshot of such processing is the visual awareness of chromatic contrasts ‘at’ the edges of surfaces, implicating the ‘colour for form’ perceptual function. This primitive type of constancy sheds new light on our most basic perceptual capacities, which mark the lower borders of representational mind. (shrink)

A brief introductory note to the special issue of the Journal of Philosophy on "Parts and Wholes", setting the background for the seven papers included in the rest of the issue (by K. Fine, H. Hudson, M. Johnston, K. Koslicki, C. Normore, P. M. Simons, and P. van Inwagen).

Nelson Goodman notoriously distinguished between autographic works, whose instances should be identified by taking history of production into account, and allographic works, whose instances can be identified independently of history of production. Scholars such as Jerrold Levinson, Flint Schier, and Gregory Currie have criticized Goodman’s autographic/allographic distinction arguing that all works are such that their instances should be identified by taking history of production into account. I will address this objection by exploiting David Davies’ distinction between e-instances and p-instances (...) of a work, thereby restating the autographic/allographic distinction. Then, I will show that this way of restating this distinction leads us to effective accounts of relevant related phenomena such as forgery, plagiarism, and digital technologies. Finally, I will show the theoretical advantages of my account of the autographic/allographic distinction in comparison with an alternative account recently proposed by Jason D’Cruz and P.D. Magnus. (shrink)

This is my main contribution to P. Gould (ed.) Beyond the Control of God?: Six Views on the Problem of God and Abstract Objects Bloomsbury. (The other contibutors to this work are: Keith Yandell; Paul Gould and Rich Davis; Greg Welty; William Lane Craig; and Scott Shalkowski.) I argue that, when it comes to a comparative assessment of the merits of theism and atheism, it makes no difference whether one opts for realism or fictionalism concerning abstract objects.

What is critical thinking, especially in the context of higher education? How have research and scholarship on the matter developed over recent past decades? What is the current state of the art here? How might the potential of critical thinking be enhanced? What kinds of teaching are necessary in order to realize that potential? And just why is this topic important now? These are the key questions motivating this volume. We hesitate to use terms such as “comprehensive” or “complete” or (...) “definitive,” but we believe that, taken in the round, the chapters in this volume together offer a fair insight into the contemporary understandings of higher education worldwide. We also believe that this volume is much needed, and we shall try to justify that claim in this introduction. (shrink)

For decades scholars thought they knew Hume's position on the existence of causes and objects he was a sceptic. However, this received view has been thrown into question by the `new readings of Hume as a sceptical realist. For philosophers, students of philosophy and others interested in theories of causation and their history, The New Hume Debate is the first book to fully document the most influential contemporary readings of Hume's work. Throughout, the volume brings the debate beyond textual issues (...) in Hume to contemporary philosophical issues concerning causation and knowledge of the external world and issues in the history of philosophy, offering the reader a model for scholarly debate. This revised paperback edition includes three new chapters by Janet Broughton, Peter Kail and Peter Millican. Contributors: Kenneth A. Richman, Barry Stroud, Galen Strawson, Kenneth P. Winkler, John P. Wright, Simon Blackburn, Edward Craig, Martin Bell, Daniel Flage, Anne Jaap Jacobson, Rupert Read, Janet Broughton, Peter Millican, Peter Kail. (shrink)

This volume brings together new work on the logic and ontology of plurality and a range of recent articles exploring novel applications to natural language semantics. The contributions in this volume in particular investigate and extend new perspectives presented by plural logic and non-standard mereology and explore their applications to a range of natural language phenomena. Contributions by P. Aquaviva, A. Arapinis, M. Carrara, P. McKay, F. Moltmann, O. Linnebo, A. Oliver and T. Smiley, T. Scaltsas, P. Simons, and B.-Y. (...) Yi . (shrink)

Antes de entrar cuidadosamente no estudo de cada filósofo, em suas respectivas ordens cronológicas, é necessário dar um panorama geral sobre eles, permitindo, de relance, a localização deles em tempos históricos e a associação de seus nomes com sua teoria ou tema central. l. OS FILÓSOFOS PRÉ-SOCRÁTICOS - No sétimo século antes de Jesus Cristo, nasce o primeiro filósofo grego: Tales de Mileto2 . Ele e os seguintes filósofos jônicos (Anaximandro: Ἀναξίμανδρος: 3 610-546 a.C.) e Anaxímenes: (Άναξιμένης: 586-524 a.C.) tentaram (...) expressar/elucidar o que é a arché, ou constitutivo fundamental do Universo. 4 Também sobressaem as teorias de Pitágoras (Ὁ Πυθαγόρας: 570 a.C.- 495 a.C.), completas de misticismo e Matemática; a de Heráclito (Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος: 540-470 a.C.), o filósofo do devir e o de seu oponente, Parmênides (Παρμενίδης: 530-460 a.C.), que elucida a primeira teoria do ser, e para qual é alcunhado como o iniciador da Metafísica. Anaxágoras (Ἀναξαγόρας: 500 a.C.- 428 a.C.) esboça uma teoria sobre o Nous, o espírito divino. Por outro lado, Demócrito (Δημόκριτος: Grécia: 460-370 a.C.) e Empédocles (Ἐμπεδοκλῆς: 490 a.C.-430 a.C.) insistem no materialismo. Em contrapartida, os sofistas (Parmênides, Cálicles (Καλλικλῆς: personagem platônico cuja existência é duvidosa) e Górgias (Γοργίας: 485 a.C.-380 a.C.)) gozam das suas aptidões à dialética, e colocam o relativismo como uma posição filosófica. Sócrates será o inimigo mais temível dessa posição. Este é o começo do movimento filosófico de Atenas, que culmina nos séculos quinto e quarto, tal qual, posteriormente, veremos. 2. O APOGEU GREGO – Sócrates (Σωκράτης: 469 a.C.-399 a.C.), Platão (Πλάτων: 428/427- 348/347 a.C.) e Aristóteles (Ἀριστοτέλης: 384 a.C.-322 a.C.) formam o triunvirato dos grandes filósofos gregos. O primeiro (Sócrates), com seu método "maiêutico" e sua teoria do conceito; o segundo (Platão), com sua teoria das ideias e seu estilo literário (dialogista); e o terceiro (Aristóteles), com a estruturação dos principais ramos filosóficos, como a Lógica, a Metafísica, a Ética, a Psicologia racional e a Política; todos eles elevaram a Filosofia para um posto de primeira ordem. Doravante, todos os filósofos tornam-se credores das contribuições desses gênios. Em certos autores, é clara a influência de Platão ou de Aristóteles. Sendo que, ambos os filósofos, tiveram influência absoluta de Sócrates, uma vez que Platão fora seu discípulo, e Aristóteles discípulo de Platão. A Idade Média, por exemplo, foi toda ela, em sua gênese e desenvolvimento, alicerçada no pensamento e nas ideias platônicas; tal era histórica é caracterizada pela luta em favor de um ou de outro autor; o platonismo tomou precedência nos primeiros séculos do cristianismo; somente após o décimo século Aristóteles foi redescoberto. 3. A FILOSOFIA CRISTÃ MEDIEVAL - Santo Agostinho (354 a.C.-430 a.C.) se destaca, no quinto século, com sua teoria da iluminação e a aplicação da teoria platônica ao Cristianismo. No século XIII, São Tomás de Aquino (1225-1274), sintetiza Aristóteles com o Cristianismo. Os dois autores formam o núcleo da filosofia cristã em seus respectivos séculos. A escolástica teve seu tempo de decadência. Se mencionam, principalmente, dois autores: João Duns Escoto (1266-1308) e Guilherme de Ockham (1285-1347). O primeiro é o "Doutor Sutil ", e o segundo cai em um fideísmo e um nominalismo, para todos os conceitos criticáveis. Em uma segunda parte, tentaremos explicar os respectivos pensamentos dos autores mencionados, e outros que pertencem ao mesmo tempo, antigos e medievais. Naquela época, a Filosofia era puramente realista, aplicada ao mundo e ao homem. Somente na Idade Moderna, a Filosofia assumirá o problema do conhecimento como a base e o começo de todo filosofar. 4. A FILOSOFIA RACIONALISTA (MODERNA) - Na Idade Moderna, sobressai o racionalismo de Descartes (1596-1650) prolongado, então, com Malebranche (1638-1715) (ocasionalismo), Espinosa (1632 -1677) (panteísmo) e Leibniz (1646-1716) (teoria das mônadas). Estamos nos séculos XVII e XVIII. A atenção será focada nas disputas filosóficas da corrente empirista contra a racionalista. 5. A FILOSOFIA EMPIRISTA – O empirismo é florescido, principalmente, na Inglaterra. Francis Bacon (1561-1626), primeiro, e depois Locke (1632-1704) com sua rejeição de ideias inatas, Berkeley (1685-1753) com postura e ideias paradoxais, também idealistas e Hume (1711-1776), com suas famosas críticas contra o princípio da causalidade e o conceito de substância, são os principais autores. 6. KANT E OS IDEALISTAS ALEMÃES - Como a tentativa de sintetizar o racionalismo e empirismo, está a teoria de Kant (1724-1804), no século XVIII. Para o seu gênio seguido pelos três idealistas alemães mais importantes: Fichte (1762-1814) (idealismo subjetivo), Schelling (1775-1854) (idealismo objetivo) e Hegel (1770-1831) (idealismo absoluto). Esses Autores representam o ápice da especulação filosófica. A análise, a profundidade, a complexidade da expressão e o espírito sistemático são as características do gênio alemão idealista. 7. OS FILÓSOFOS DO SÉCULO XIX - Antes de tudo, é necessário mencionar, no século dezenove, aos dois grandes críticos de Hegel, que são Kierkegaard (1813-1855) (precursor do existencialismo) e Marx (1818-1883) (com seu materialismo dialético). O próximo é outro casal: Nietzsche (1844-1900) (teoria do Super-homem) e Schopenhauer (1788-1860) (com seu absoluto pessimismo). Comte (1798-1857) com sua doutrina positivista, completará o quadro desses filósofos. Numa outra oportunidade, vamos desmembrar sobre o pensamento e principais ideias acerca desses autores. 8. OS FILÓSOFOS DO SÉCULO XX - Antes de tudo, há um autor que iluminou a filosofia do século XX: Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), fundador do método fenomenológico. Em seguida, existem dois fluxos que são derivados diretamente de Husserl, a saber, o existencialismo e a axiologia. Dentro da corrente axiológica, estudaremos Scheler (1874-2928). Por outro lado, o existencialismo tem quatro autores principais; dois são alemães: Heidegger (1889-1976) e Jaspers (1883-1969); e os demais são franceses: Sartre (1905-1980) e Marcel (1889-1973). Heidegger insiste em que seu tema tratado em sua filosofia não é a unicidade do homem, mas o ser em geral. Jaspers é famoso por seu conceito de transcendência (Deus). Sartre é um antiteísta sincero, e seu existencialismo é definido como um pensamento que assume todas as consequências da negação de Deus. Em contraste, Gabriel Marcel é um filósofo Católico, que conseguiu uma análise profunda das situações humanas, que aparecem em íntima concordância com as verdades cristãs. Vamos terminar com Russell (1872-1970), autor básico do positivismo lógico. Cronologia de filósofos e suas escolas até nossos dias ➢ Filosofia Antiga - Escola naturalista da Jônia: Tales, Anaximandro e Anaxímenes; - Escola matemática da Itália: Pitágoras e os pitagóricos; - Escola idealista de Eléia: Xenófanes (570-475 a.C.), Parmênides, Zenão (490/85-420 a.C.) e Meliso (h.443); - Escola empirista: Heráclito, Empédocles e Anaxágoras; - Escola atomista de Abdera: Leucipo (h.437) e Demócrito; - Escolas de Atenas: - Sofistas: Protágoras (480-410), Górgias (484-375?); Sócrates, Platão e Aristóteles; - Pirronismo: Pirro (h.365-h.275); - Estoicismo: Zenão de Cítio (359/33-262) e Crisipo (281/77-208); - Epicurismo: Epicuro (341-270); - Nova Academia: Arcesilau (315-241) e Carnéades (214-129); Romanos: Sêneca (4 a.C.-65 d.C.), Marco Aurélio (121-180) e Cícero (106-43). - Escola greco-judia: Fílon de Alexandria (25 a.C.-50 d.C.); - Neoplatonismo: Plotino (204/5-270), Porfirio (h.233-304), Jâmblico (h.250-330) e Proclo (h.411-485). ➢ Filosofia patrística - Apologistas: São Justino (100/10-165), Ireneu de Lyon (h.140-h.l 77) e Atenágoras (fines s. II); - Alexandrinos: São Clemente (h.145/50-215) e Orígenes (h.185-255); - Africanos: Tertuliano (h.160-230), Arnóbio (h.260-h.327) e Lactâncio (nascido h. 250); - Gregos: São Basílio (h.330-379), São Gregório de Nazianzo (330-390), São Gregório de Níssa (330-390) e Pseudo-Dionísio (h.500); - Latinos: São Hilário (h.315-367), Santo Ambrósio (333-397) e Santo Agostinho; - Outros: Claudiano (+h.473), Boécio (480-524), São Isidoro (h.560-633) e Beda (672/3-735). ➢ Filosofia Medieval/Escolástica - Judeus: Isaac Israeli (+h.940), Salomão Ibn Gabirol (h.l020-p.l058) e Maimônides (1135- 1204); - Árabes: Alquindi (h. 796-874), Al-Farabi (870-950), Avicena (980-1037), Algazali (1058- 1111) e Averróis (1126-1198); - Escola palatina: Alcuíno de Iorque (730/5-804), Rábano Mauro (h.784-856), Escoto Erígena (h.810-h.870) e Papa Silvestre II (+1003); - Dialéticos: Santo Anselmo (1033/4-1109) e Pedro Abelardo (1079-1142); - Tradutores: Domingo Gundisalvo (meados s. XII), Gerardo de Cremona (h. 1114-1187); - Enciclopedistas: Teodorico de Chartres (+1155), Hugo de São Vitor (+1141) e Vicente de Beauvais (+1264); - Universidades: Guilherme de Auvergne (1180- 1249) e Sigerio de Brabante (+h.l284); - Dominicanos: São Alberto Magno (1206-1280) e Santo Tomás de Aquino; - Franciscanos: Alexandre de Hales (1170/80-1245), São Boaventura (1217-1274), Roger Bacon (h.1210/14-1292), João Duns Escoto, Raimundo Lulio (1235-1315) e Guilherme de Ockham (h.1285-1349). ➢ Filosofia Moderna - Humanistas Renascentistas: Ficino (1433-1499), Erasmo (1467-1536), Maquiavel (1469- 1527), Thomas More (1480-1535), Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540) e Giordano Bruno (1548- 1600); - Racionalismo: Descartes, Malebranche, Espinosa e Leibniz; - Empiristas: Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Locke, Berkeley e Hume; - Escola escocesa: Thomas Reid (1710-1796); Iluministas: Voltaire (1694-1778), Condillac (1715-1757), Diderot (1713-1784) e J. J. Rousseau (1712-1778). - Idealismo transcendental: Kant; - Idealismo subjetivo: Fichte; - Idealismo objetivo: Schelling; - Idealismo absoluto: Hegel; - Pessimismo: Schopenhauer; - Ecletismo: Cousin (1792-1867); - Positivismo: A. Comte, J. S. Mill (1806-1873) e H. Spencer (1820-1900); - Socialismo: H. Saint-Simon (1760-1825), Ch. Fourier (1772-1837) e K. Marx; - Vitalismo: Nietzsche e W. Dilthey (1833-1912). ➢ Filosofia Contemporânea - Intucionismo: H. Bergson (1859-1941); - Pragmatismo: Ch. S. Peirce (1839-1914), W. James (1842-1910) e J. Dewey (1859-1952); - Fenomenologia: Husserl, Scheler, N. Hartmann (1882-1950) e M. Merleau-Ponty (1908- 1961); - Existencialismo: Jaspers, Heidegger, Marcel e Sartre; - Atomismo lógico: B. Russell (1872-1970) e L. Wittgenstein (1889-1951); - Positivismo lógico: M. Schlick (1882-1936), R. Carnap (1891-1970 ) e A. J. Ayer (1910- 1990). - Filosofia analítica: J. L. Austin (1911-1960), G. Ryle (1900-1976), W.V.O. Quine (1908- 2000), P. F. Strawson (1919-2003) e H. Putnam (1926-); - Hermenêutica: H. G. Gadamer (1900-2002), P. Ricoeur (1913-2007) e J. Habermas (1929-). - Estruturalismo e pós-estruturalismo: F. de Saussure (1857-1913), C. Lévi-Strauss (1908- 2009) e M. Foucault (1926-1984). - Filosofia pós-moderna: J. F. Lyotard (1924-1999), G. Deleuze (1925-1995), J. Derrida (1930- 2004), R. Rorty (1931-2007) e G. Vattimo (1936-). - Comunitaristas: A. Maclntyre (1929-), Ch. Taylor (1931-). REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS CHAUÍ, M. Iniciação à Filosofia. Vol. Único. 2ª ed. São Paulo: Ática, 2013. 460 p. SANTOS, R. dos. Filosofia: Uma breve introdução. 1ª ed. Pelotas: Dissertativo Incipiens, 2014. 108 p. . Rua do Riachuelo, 303, Centro, Rio de Janeiro, RJ Casa Histórica de Osório CEP: 20230-011 E-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

PRINCÍPIOS DA DIGESTÃO DOS ALIMENTOS NOS BEZERROS -/- -/- E. I. C. da Silva -/- Departamento de Agropecuária – IFPE Campus Belo Jardim -/- Departamento de Zootecnia – UFRPE sede -/- -/- PRINCÍPIOS DA DIGESTÃO DOS ALIMENTOS NOS BEZERROS -/- -/- INTRODUÇÃO -/- Se todos os bezerros pudessem ser criados por suas mães, haveria pouca necessidade de inúmeros livros, artigos e trabalhos, como esse, sobre a criação e o manejo básico desses animais. A maioria das vacas desempenha um ótimo papel (...) na criação dos seus descendentes, desde que sejam tomados os devidos cuidados com relação a alimentação, saúde e a outros aspectos relativos à criação desses neonatos. A essência da pecuária bovina relativa à criação de bezerros é manter esses animais vivos e aptos o suficiente para desempenhar atividades produtivas de grande importância na propriedade. Para tanto, os criadores necessitam entender o desenvolvimento do trato digestivo do bezerro e os conceitos básicos da digestão dos alimentos por ele, e é isso que pretendo aclarar de forma clara e concisa com esse trabalho. -/- -/- 1.1 O TRATO DIGESTIVO DO BEZERRO -/- Um animal adulto necessita de quatro estômagos funcionais para dar-lhe a capacidade de utilizar a ampla gama de alimentos disponíveis. -/- O retículo e o rúmen abrigam milhões de micróbios que fermentam e digerem o material vegetal, em especial às presentes nas forragens. O omaso permite a absorção de água do conteúdo do intestino. O abomaso, ou quarto estômago, é o verdadeiro estômago, comparável ao dos humanos, e permite a digestão ácida dos alimentos. -/- O bezerro muito jovem não desenvolve a capacidade de digerir o pasto, sendo assim o abomaso é o único estômago funcional ao nascer. Tanto os animais recém-nascidos como os adultos têm um intestino delgado funcional que permite a digestão alcalina dos alimentos. -/- A figura 1 ilustra a anatomia dos estômagos e intestino delgado de um bezerro recém-nascido. Esse diagrama esquemático mostra as dimensões relativas dos quatro estômagos, o sulco esofágico, que vai do esôfago até o abomaso, e o esfíncter pilórico ou válvula no fundo do abomaso, que controla a velocidade de movimento do conteúdo do intestino no duodeno. -/- O omaso e o abomaso representam cerca de 70% da capacidade total do estômago no bezerro recém-nascido. Por outro lado, nas vacas adultas, eles compõem apenas 30% da capacidade total do estômago (figura 2). -/- A digestão dos alimentos é auxiliada pela secreção de certos produtos químicos denominados enzimas, que estão presentes nas várias partes do intestino. Por exemplo, os bezerros produzem a enzima renina na parede do abomasal para auxiliar na digestão das proteínas do leite, enquanto a lactase é produzida na parede do duodeno para a digestão do açúcar do leite (lactose). Estas enzimas operam mais eficazmente em diferentes níveis de acidez no conteúdo do intestino, ácido no abomaso e alcalino no duodeno. Para conseguir isso, o bezerro segrega eletrólitos, ou sais minerais, com as enzimas, para mudar o conteúdo do intestino de um tipo para outro. -/- Os produtos finais da digestão dos diferentes componentes dos alimentos são absorvidos através da parede do intestino, mediante as vilosidades intestinais, para a corrente sanguínea, onde são levados para as diferentes partes do corpo para o crescimento e desenvolvimento do animal. -/- -/- 1.2 O BEZERRO ALIMENTADO COM LEITE -/- O Leite ou substituto do leite, quer seja apreendido através de uma teta ou bebido de um balde, é canalizado do esôfago através do sulco esofágico para o abomaso. Este sulco é um pequeno canal na parede do rúmen que é controlado por músculos que permitem que os líquidos sejam diretamente enviados para o abomaso e que não entrem no rúmen. O sulco é ativado em resposta a diferentes estímulos. Funciona bem quando os bezerros amamentam-se através das tetas das mães, mas às vezes não funciona quando bebem de um balde. Essa parece ser uma condição psicológica em resposta aos bezerros separados de suas mães. A maioria dos bezerros podem ser treinados pelo tratador para beber o leite do balde rapidamente e bem, a metodologia empregada é a da persuasão do animal, ao qual o mesmo possa responder positivamente à nova rotina diária e à mãe substituta na forma do criador do bezerro. Quando o leite ou o substituto do leite entra no abomaso, forma um coágulo firme dentro de alguns minutos sob a influência das enzimas renina e pepsina. Este é o mesmo processo envolvido na fabricação de queijo ou junket, usando renina para coagular a proteína do leite. A coagulação do leite retarda a taxa em que flui para fora do abomaso, permitindo assim uma liberação constante de nutrientes alimentares em todo o intestino e, eventualmente, para a corrente sanguínea. Pode levar de 12 a 18 horas para que a coalhada de leite seja totalmente digerida. -/- As enzimas que atuam nas proteínas do leite requerem um ambiente ácido e esse é fornecido pela secreção do ácido clorídrico no abomaso. No entanto, até que a digestão ácida esteja operando de forma eficiente, e isso pode levar até sete dias, a única forma de proteína que pode ser digerida é a caseína. Não há substituto para a caseína no bezerro muito jovem. Os substitutos do leite que contêm outras formas de proteína não podem ser devidamente digeridos até que os bezerros sejam mais velhos. Logo, é necessário muito cuidado para não fornecer substitutos ou sucedâneos que contenham fontes proteicas que não possam ser digeridas pelo estômago do animal, para que não ocasione complicações gastrintestinais. -/- A digestão do leite pode ser melhorada com a inclusão de coalho, que pode ser obtido a partir de fábricas de queijo ou aditivos comerciais de leite de bezerro para a primeira semana ou mais. Esses produtos comerciais podem fornecer ácidos adicionais para reduzir o pH abomasal e incrementar a quantidade de enzimas e bactérias específicas para aumentar a taxa de degradação da coalhada de leite. Tais aditivos são chamados probióticos, na medida em que ajudam nos processos digestivos normais. A pesquisa nem sempre os encontrou para melhorar o desempenho e a saúde dos bezerros, e eles são mais propensos a ser benéficos quando os bezerros estão sofrendo de problemas de saúde. Além disso, a sua eficácia, em termos de custo-benefício é, por vezes, questionada. -/- Qualquer leite de uma alimentação anterior está envolvido neste coágulo recém-formado. As proteínas líquidas de soro de leite e a lactose são rapidamente separadas da coalhada de leite e passam para o abomaso. A gordura do leite contida na coalhada de leite é decomposta por outra enzima, a lipase. Esta é secretado na boca pela saliva e incorporada quando o leite é engolido. A alimentação pelas tetas em vez da alimentação através do balde parece produzir mais saliva e, portanto, mais lipase. A digestão adicional da proteína do leite e da gordura ocorre no duodeno com a ajuda das enzimas produzidas no pâncreas. -/- A lactose, que é rapidamente liberada da coalhada de leite no abomaso, é dividida em glicose e galactose e estas são absorvidas na corrente sanguínea para formar a principal fonte de energia para os bezerros jovens. -/- As gorduras são divididas em ácidos graxos e glicerol para absorção e uso como energia, enquanto as proteínas são divididas em aminoácidos e peptídeos para absorção e uso como fontes de proteína corporal. -/- O amido de cereais, por exemplo, é uma importante fonte de energia em bezerros mais velhos, mas esses animais, nas suas primeiras semanas de vida, não conseguem digerir o amido. -/- O abomaso não é ácido até que o bezerro tenha 1-2 dias de idade e isso apresenta vantagens e desvantagens. A principal vantagem é que as proteínas imunes no colostro não podem ser digeridas nesse compartimento estomacal, por isso são absorvidas na corrente sanguínea na mesma forma quando produzidas pela vaca. Isso garante o seu papel como anticorpos para proteger contra as doenças e infecções. A baixa acidez do conteúdo abomasal no bezerro recém-nascido constitui um risco potencial das bactérias (e provavelmente vírus) tomadas através da boca. Estes não serão mortos pela digestão ácida, sendo assim podem passar para os intestinos, onde podem fazer mal ao bezerro recém-nascido. -/- Todos os bezerros pegam bactérias nos primeiros dias de vida e isso é essencial para o desenvolvimento normal do rúmen (flora microbiana). No entanto, a primeira bactéria a colonizar o intestino também pode causar danos. Desde que o bezerro tenha bebido colostro, os anticorpos maternos podem controlar a propagação dessas bactérias mais nocivas. -/- O bezerro alimentado com leite deve, então, produzir uma digestão ácida no abomaso e uma digestão alcalina no duodeno. Isto é conseguido pela produção de eletrólitos na parede do intestino. -/- Bezerros que sofrem de escoriações devido a distúrbios nutricionais ou infecções bacterianas podem perder grandes quantidades de água e eletrólitos em suas fezes. Estes devem ser reabastecidos como parte do tratamento para as escoriações. -/- O colostro é o primeiro leite produzido por vacas recém-paridas. Além de fornecer nutrientes essenciais para a alimentação animal, fornece anticorpos maternos que permitem a transferência passiva de imunidade contra doenças. As recomendações para a alimentação com colostro serão abordadas brevemente em outro trabalho. -/- -/- 1.3 DESENVOLVIMENTO DO RÚMEN E O PROCESSO DE DESMAME -/- Quando os bezerros são desmamados, o custo da criação diminui acentuadamente. Os custos de alimentação são mais baixos, os insumos de trabalho são reduzidos e a incidência de problemas de saúde é menor. No sentido econômico, faz sentido desmamar os bezerros assim que for razoável. No entanto, o bezerro é forçado a sofrer várias mudanças dramáticas, a saber: -/-  A fonte primária de nutrientes muda de líquido para sólido. -/-  A quantidade de matéria seca que o bezerro recebe é reduzida. -/-  O bezerro deve adaptar-se de um tipo monogástrico a um ruminante de digestão, que inclui a fermentação de alimentos. -/-  Mudanças na habitação e no manejo muitas vezes ocorrem em torno do desmame, o que pode aumentar o estresse. -/- Ao nascer, o rúmen é uma parte pequena e estéril do intestino que, ao desmame deve se tornar o compartimento mais importante dos quatro estômagos. Deve aumentar em tamanho, atividade metabólica interna e fluxo sanguíneo externo. Os cinco requisitos para o desenvolvimento ruminal são: -/-  Estabelecimento de bactérias. -/-  Líquido. -/-  Saída de material (ação muscular). -/-  Capacidade absortiva do tecido. -/-  Substrato para permitir o crescimento bacteriano, tais como minerais reciclados, bem como nutrientes para alimentação. -/- Antes do consumo de alimentos sólidos, as bactérias existentes fermentam o cabelo ingerido, o estrato e o leite que flui do abomaso para o rúmen. A maior parte da água que entra no rúmen provém da água livre (água real não contida no leite ou na solução substituta do leite). O leite contornará o rúmen através do sulco esofágico, enquanto a água livre não. -/- O rúmen se desenvolve a partir de um órgão muito pequeno em bezerros recém-nascidos (1-2 L) para a parte mais importante do intestino (25-30 L) por 3 meses de idade. Ele pode aumentar muito rapidamente durante as primeiras semanas de vida, dado o manejo da alimentação direita. -/- O crescimento do rúmen ocorre apenas sob a influência dos produtos finais da digestão no mesmo, que resultam da fermentação de alimentos sólidos pelos micróbios presentes nesse compartimento. O desenvolvimento ocorre em grande parte através do crescimento das papilas ruminais (figura 5 e 6) na parede ruminal (estruturas semelhantes a folhas na superfície interna), que aumentam a área superficial do rúmen e, portanto, a sua capacidade de absorver estes produtos finais de digestão. Portanto, os concentrados favorecem melhor o desenvolvimento dessas papilas ruminais. Para tanto, é necessário, com um tempo, ir incrementando a dieta sólida gradativamente para que esses animais deixem de consumir o leite das vacas produtoras e possam alimentar-se de ração e pastagens, que é a finalidade da criação de bovinos, ou seja, criar animais com menor custo possível e engordá-los através de ração, mas principalmente de pastagens. -/- A capacidade do rúmen e a ingestão de alimentos sólidos estão intimamente relacionadas. O desenvolvimento do rúmen é muito lento em bezerros alimentados com grandes quantidades de leite. O leite satisfaz seus apetites para que eles não tenham fome suficiente para comer qualquer alimento sólido. Logo, é necessário diminuir paulatinamente o fornecedor do leite para esses animais, favorecendo a ingestão de alimentos sólidos e desenvolvendo o rúmen, estômago que digere as fibras das forragens e que os tona animais peculiares. -/- A ruminação pode ocorrer com cerca de 2 semanas de idade e é uma boa indicação de que o rúmen está se desenvolvendo. Alimentos sólidos, bem como a ruminação, estimulam a produção de saliva e isso fornece nutrientes como ureia e bicarbonato de sódio para produzir os substratos para o crescimento e desenvolvimento da flora bacteriana. -/- No desmame precoce, é importante limitar a quantidade de leite oferecida e a sua disponibilidade durante todo o dia. Também é essencial fornecer alimentos sólidos. Os grosseiros (de baixa ou alta qualidade) devem ser oferecidos em combinação com concentrados de alta qualidade. -/- O criador deve tomar cuidado com o fornecimento de alimentos como a ração farelada, uma vez que essa ração pode entrar pelas vias nasais e ocasionar complicações respiratórias; há alguns relatos de bezerros mortos após a ingestão de ração farelada, na autópsia de um dos casos foi diagnosticada uma morte por esses grãos farelados presentes no pulmão. Portanto, para evitar complicações o ideal é que se forneça uma ração denominada peletizada. -/- Os alimentos grosseiros (volumosos) estimulam o desenvolvimento do rúmen, enquanto os concentrados fornecem nutrientes para a alimentação animal que não são fornecidos pelas quantidades limitadas de leite oferecidas. Sem os concentrados, o crescimento dos bezerros é lento, mas o rúmen ainda se desenvolve, resultando em animais barrigudos. -/- A ureia fornece nitrogênio para os micróbios, enquanto o bicarbonato de sódio atua como um tampão ruminal, ajudando a manter um pH estável no conteúdo do rúmen. Isso é, particularmente, importante quando os bezerros comem grandes quantidades de grãos de cereais na vida adulta, pois os micróbios do rúmen podem produzir muito ácido lático durante a fermentação desse material. -/- Envenenamento por grãos ou acidose ocorre quando os níveis de ácido lático são excessivamente elevados e tornam-se tóxicos para os micróbios do rúmen e, eventualmente, para o animal. Assim como os produtos finais que são absorvidos através da parede do rúmen, a fermentação microbiana produz os gases dióxido de carbono e metano e estes são normalmente exalados. Quando algo impede a fuga destes gases do rúmen, o inchaço pode se manifestar em qualquer fase da vida, diz-se do animal estufado. -/- -/- 1.4 O PAPEL DA FORRAGEM NO PROCESSO DE DESMAME -/- Existem inúmeras controvérsias acerca do papel da forragem no processo de desmame. Pesquisas realizadas na década de 1980 indicaram claramente que a forragem era benéfica, enquanto pesquisas da década de 1990 descobriram que nem sempre era necessário o fornecimento da forragem para que os bezerros fossem desmamados e que não sofresse estresse e nem apresentasse baixa eficiência produtiva e reprodutiva no futuro. Na maioria das pesquisas anteriores, os bezerros eram desmamados com a oferta de concentrados moídos como pellets com ou sem a presença de feno longo ou palha. Porém, a inclusão de forragens na dieta melhorou a ingestão e o desempenho, além de permitir o desmame precoce. -/- Na pesquisa posterior, os bezerros geralmente alimentavam-se de concentrados grosseiramente moídos, além de alguns volumosos, enquanto alguns até incluíam volumosos picados finos na mistura (às vezes chamados de mistura muesli por apresentar o capim e a ração). Nesses estudos, verificou-se que a inclusão de feno ou palha adicional teve pouco efeito no desempenho pré-desmame. -/- Os sistemas de criação de bezerros australianos frequentemente diferem dos demais, especialmente em áreas de parto sazonais. Um número excessivo elevado de bezerros precisam ser criados de uma só vez para lhes fornecer, a todos, currais individuais durante todo o seu período de amamentação. Consequentemente, os bezerros são criados em grupos. Além disso, os ingredientes da maioria dos concentrados para esses animais são finamente moídos. Nessas situações, descobriu-se que a palha limpa é um alimento útil e que deve ser incluso no período pré-desmame. Alguns agricultores preferem feno de boa qualidade, porém estes agricultores geralmente têm bezerros em grupos muito pequenos, muitas vezes um ou dois, por isso possuem maior controle sobre a ingestão de forragem. -/- Figura 7: A alimentação volumosa de bezerros alimentados com leite é uma questão controversa. Imagem cedida pelo IPA -/- É difícil e, portanto, mais caro que os produtores de rações incorporem feno picado nas refeições dos bezerros. Os pellets são muito mais fáceis, pois eles vão fluir para silos. Por fim, os produtores de leite devem incluir o componente volumoso no regime alimentar pré-desmame. A pastagem não é a fonte ideal de forragem volumosa para os bezerros alimentados com leite, uma vez que possui muito pouca fibra e uma baixa densidade de energia alimentar. O seu elevado teor de água limita a sua capacidade de fornecer energia alimentar adequada aos animais em crescimento. Para ingerir a pastagem a capacidade ruminal deveria ser maior, bezerros jovens simplesmente não conseguem comer pasto suficiente, a menos que seja de alta em qualidade. -/- Os bezerros criados com leite e fornecimento gradual de concentrados apresentam uma boa função ruminal às 3 semanas de vida, além de possuírem uma suficiente capacidade ruminal para o desmame entre às 4-6 semanas de idade. No entanto, se a dieta for baseada em leite restrito e pastagem de alta qualidade, a capacidade do rúmen pode não ser suficiente para o desmame até às 8-10 semanas de vida. Mesmo assim, as taxas de crescimento seriam menores em bezerros desmamados com base alimentar somente à pasto, uma vez que a ingestão de energia é insuficiente devido às limitações físicas da capacidade ruminal. -/- Se a qualidade for muito boa e produza apetite, os bezerros preferem volumosos ao invés do concentrado, o que leva a uma ingestão reduzida de nutrientes durante alimentação, tendo como efeito um crescimento mais lento. Quando volumosos e concentrados fornecem apetite no animal, juntamente com o leite limitado, os bezerros podem comer cerca de 10% de palha e 90% de concentrados. Sem o volumoso e a ruminação resultante, o desenvolvimento do rúmen será mais lento devido à falta de saliva e produtos finais da digestão de fibras presentes na parede celular das forragens. -/- -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- -/- BEN ASHER, Aharon. Manual de cría de becerras. Zaragoza: Acribia, 1999. -/- BITTAR, Carla Maris Machado; PORTAL, Rafaela Nunes Sanchez; PEREIRA, Anna Carolina Fett da Cunha. Criação de bezerras leiteiras. Piracicaba: EDUSP, 2018. -/- BLUM, J. W. Nutritional physiology of neonatal calves. Journal of animal physiology and animal nutrition, v. 90, n. 1‐2, p. 1-11, 2006. -/- CAMPOS, OF de. Criação de bezerros até a desmama. Coronel Pacheco: EMBRAPA/CNPGL, 1985. -/- COELHO, S. G. Criação de bezerros. II Simpósio Mineiro de Buiatria, Anais., Belo Horizonte, 2005. -/- DAVIS, Carl L. et al. The development, nutrition, and management of the young calf. Iowa State University Press, 1998. -/- DE OLIVEIRA, Juliana Silva; DE MOURA ZANINE, Anderson; SANTOS, Edson Mauro. Fisiologia, manejo e alimentação de bezerros de corte. Arquivos de Ciências Veterinárias e Zoologia da UNIPAR, v. 10, n. 1, 2007. -/- DRACKLEY, James K. Calf nutrition from birth to breeding. Veterinary Clinics of North America: Food Animal Practice, v. 24, n. 1, p. 55-86, 2008. -/- FERREIRA, Lucas Silveira et al. Desempenho animal e desenvolvimento do rúmen de bezerros leiteiros aleitados com leite integral ou sucedâneo. Boletim de Indústria Animal, v. 65, n. 4, p. 337-345, 2008. -/- GUILLOTEAU, P.; ZABIELSKI, R.; BLUM, J. W. Gastrointestinal tract and digestion in the young ruminant: ontogenesis, adaptations, consequences and manipulations. J Physiol Pharmacol, v. 60, n. Suppl 1, p. 37-46, 2009. -/- HUBER, J. T. Development of the digestive and metabolic apparatus of the calf. Journal of Dairy Science, v. 52, n. 8, p. 1303-1315, 1969. -/- LONGENBACH, J. I.; HEINRICHS, Arlyn Judson. A review of the importance and physiological role of curd formation in the abomasum of young calves. Animal feed science and technology, v. 73, n. 1-2, p. 85-97, 1998. -/- LOPES, Marcos Aurélio; VIEIRA, P. de F. Criação de bezerros leiteiros. Jaboticabal: Funep, 1998. -/- LUCCI, Carlos de Sousa. Bovinos leiteiros jovens: nutrição, manejo, doenças. São Paulo: Nobel, 1989. -/- ROY, James Henry Barstow et al. The calf. Boston: Butterworths., 1980. -/- SAVAGE, E. S.; MCCAY, C. M. The nutrition of calves; A review. Journal of Dairy Science, v. 25, n. 7, p. 595-650, 1942. -/- THIVEND, P.; TOULLEC, R.; GUILLOTEAU, P. Digestive adaptation in the preruminant. In: Digestive physiology and metabolism in ruminants. Springer, Dordrecht, 1980. p. 561-585. (shrink)